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Abstract
 
This paper examines the wealth effects of financial-institution strategic alliances 
on the shareholders of the newly allied firms.  Our paper is different from previous 
studies of non-financial joint ventures, financial and non-financial mergers and 
acquisitions, and non-financial strategic alliances in three important aspects/ways:  First, 
we focus on financial institutions that form strategic alliances.  Second, while most 
related studies use U.S. data, this paper employs Japanese data for the late 1990s, directly 
testing financial theory in a different setting.  Finally, we study whether different types of 
alliances result in differing magnitudes of stock market responses. 
 
Our primary results are as follows: First, we find that a strategic alliance, on 
average, increases the value of the partner firms.  This is consistent with the “synergy” 
hypothesis.  Second, the gains from the alliance are spread more widely among the 
partners than would be suggested by a random alternative, supporting a “win-win” 
hypothesis.  Third, smaller partners tend to experience larger percentage gains, which is 
consistent with a “relative size” hypothesis.  Fourth, the market values inter-group 
alliance announcements more than intra-group alliance announcements; the latter may 
well be seen as redundant.  This is consistent with an “inter-group synergies” hypothesis.  
Fifth, we do not find a significant difference in the abnormal returns showed by 
domestic-foreign alliances and domestic-domestic alliances, although both sets of 
alliances show significantly positive returns.  We thus do not find support for a “foreign 
firm superior” hypothesis.  Finally, we find that an investment-banking alliance has a 
strong positive effect on abnormal returns, indicating that investment banking, which has 
been underdeveloped in Japan relative to the U.S., may be a promising business for 
financial institutions. 
 
Overall, this paper complements the existing literature in that we analyze the 
value of financial institution alliances.  Our analysis reconfirms that strategic alliances 
are value-enhancing.  This is consistent with previous studies that find increased value in 
the announcement of a strategic alliance or a merger.  Our results are consistent with the 
notion that financial deregulation tends to increase competition, which, in turn, 
encourages firms to adopt aggressive corporate strategies.  This is viewed as a positive 
move by investors, as evidenced by the average gains of the shareholders of these 
alliance-forging firms. 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
In a modern economy, corporations (both financial and non-financial) often 
pursue a variety of strategies to achieve different stated objectives.  Whether it is finance-
related, marketing-related, or operation-related, a sensible strategy should be expected to 
strengthen a firm's competitive advantages and therefore increase firm value in the long 
run. 
Among various types of corporate strategies, strategic alliances are commonly 
used by many non-financial firms.1  Broadly defined, a strategic alliance can take many 
different forms, including non-contractual agreements, contractual agreements, joint 
ventures, and (at the limit) mergers and acquisitions.  Unlike many single-firm strategies 
(e.g., stock repurchases), strategic alliances are special, in that an alliance usually 
involves two or more firms and these partner firms form an alliance so as to be able to 
continue to focus resources on their own core skills and competencies while being able to 
utilize other components or capabilities from the partner firms. 
One natural question arises:  Are strategic alliances value-enhancing?  In 
response to this question, a number of empirical studies have documented the effects of 
joint ventures between non-financial firms on the shareholder wealth of partner firms.  
Also, a few empirical studies have examined the effects of bank mergers and acquisitions 
(an extreme form of strategic alliance) on the stock prices of acquiring and target banks.  
In addition, numerous papers in corporate finance have investigated the abnormal stock 
returns of non-financial firms upon the announcement of a merger or acquisition. 
                                                 
1 According to CIO Magazine (October 15, 1999), more than 20,000 corporate alliances were formed 
worldwide during 1997-1998. 
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What goes unanswered is: What effect does a strategic alliance involving 
financial institutions have on the stock prices of the partner institutions?  This paper 
attempts to answer this question by examining the wealth effects of financial-institution 
strategic alliances on the shareholders of the newly allied firms.  To the best of our 
knowledge our paper is the first one to measure empirically the value of strategic 
alliances among financial services firms. 
 Our study is related to three main lines of research.  The first line of research 
investigates the wealth effects of mergers and/or acquisitions generally.  The broad 
evidence, recently summarized by Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), that the 
shareholders of acquired firms earn positive and statistically significant abnormal returns, 
while the abnormal returns of acquiring companies are generally negative but not 
significantly different from zero.2   The net combined effect is positive and significant. 
The second line of research looks into the benefits of non-financial joint ventures.  
Using a sample of joint ventures involving only U.S. firms, McConnell and Nantell (1985) 
find that significant wealth gains are created from joint ventures and that the smaller partner 
in a joint venture usually earns a larger positive abnormal return.  Crutchley, Guo, and 
Hansen (1991) study cross-border joint ventures formed between Japanese and U.S. firms.  
They find that both Japanese and U.S. shareholders benefit from the announcement of an 
international joint venture.  Specifically, one interesting result is that larger Japanese firms, 
relative to their U.S. partners, earn larger abnormal returns, whereas smaller U.S. firms, 
relative to their Japanese partners, gain more.  Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin (1997) 
use 345 non-equity strategic alliances between U.S. firms over the period 1983-1992 to 
examine the wealth effects of alliance announcements.  They document that positive 
                                                 
2 See also earlier surveys by Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988). 
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abnormal returns are associated with strategic alliances, and there is no evidence of wealth 
transfers between partners.  They also find that compared with marketing alliances, 
horizontal alliances create more value when they involve the transfer and/or pooling of 
technical knowledge. 
The third line of research analyzes the wealth effects of U.S. bank mergers and 
acquisitions. Desai and Stover (1985) examine the wealth effects of a bank holding 
company’s shareholders when the bank holding company initiates an intra-state 
acquisition.  They find that significant positive abnormal returns to bank holding 
company shareholders are associated with the announcement of an acquisition.  This 
result, they argue, is consistent with the shareholder value-maximizing behavior of the 
bank holding company management.  James and Wier (1983) examine 60 intra-state bank 
acquisitions over the period 1972-1982 to determine the sources of acquirer gains.  They 
find that gains to acquirers are positively related to the number of alternative targets and 
negatively related to the number of potential bidders.  Neely (1987) studies 26 
successfully acquired and acquiring banking firms over the period 1979-1985.  His major 
finding is that while target bank shareholders earn large abnormal returns during the 
announcement week, acquirers’ returns are slightly negative during the same week.  
Cornett and De (1991) investigate stock market reactions to the 152 announcements of 
interstate bank mergers that took place in the U.S. during the period 1982-1985.  They 
document that both the bidding and target banks earn significant positive abnormal 
returns.  With respect to the target banks, the finding is consistent with those of most 
studies that focus on non-financial mergers and acquisitions. 
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Our paper is different from previous studies on non-financial joint ventures, 
financial and non-financial mergers and acquisitions, and non-financial strategic alliances 
in three important aspects or ways.  First, we focus on financial institutions that form 
strategic alliances.  Second, while most related studies use U.S. data, this paper employs 
Japanese data for the late 1990s, directly testing financial theory in a different setting.  
Finally, we examine whether different types of alliances result in differing magnitudes of 
stock market responses. 
This paper is organized as follows:  Section II summarizes the Big Bang financial 
reform in Japan.  We discuss theories about strategic alliances and propose some 
hypotheses in Section III.  Section IV describes data, summary statistics and 
methodology, and presents our results.  Section V discusses some implications of our 
findings.  Section VI summarizes and concludes. 
      
II.  The Big Bang Financial Reforms 
 In order to understand the context for our study of strategic alliances among 
Japanese financial firms in the late 1990s, some background on the Japanese financial 
system and the policy changes of the 1990s may be useful.3
On November 11, 1996, Japan’s Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto announced a 
plan to open up, reform, and substantially deregulate the country’s financial sector.  This 
“Big Bang” reform plan aimed at reviving Japan’s financial markets by making them free 
(in competition), fair (on rules), and global (in terms of participants) by 2001.  The 
ultimate goal was to make the Tokyo financial markets among the largest international 
financial centers, comparable with those of London and New York.  The proposed 
deregulation measures were designed to allow the establishment of financial holding 
                                                 
3 Additional background can be found in, for example, Sheard (1989, 1994), Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard 
(1994), Craig (1998), and Chiou (2001). 
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companies, to enhance asset securitization, to improve electronic settlements, to expand 
the permissible activities of banks and securities companies, to liberalize foreign 
exchange services, and to revitalize securities markets.      
 Similar to the pre-1999 financial system in the U.S.,4 commercial banking, 
investment banking, and insurance businesses in Japan had been separated strictly until 
the early 1990s.5  In addition, the banking industry has been quite segmented in that the 
industry is further divided into three categories:  commercial banking, long-term banking, 
and trust banking, with different laws governing different types of banking business. 
While the Big Bang plan represented the first comprehensive structural reform in Japan’s 
financial system, financial deregulation has been occurring since the early 1990s, though, 
at different paces and degrees. 
Since the November 1996 announcement, a few major pieces of legislation have 
been passed and implemented.  The major legislative changes can be categorized into the 
following major areas.6
 
A. Institutional-Structure Reform 
Holding companies7 were banned by Section 9 of the Anti-Monopoly Act of 1947 
during the post-World War II U.S. occupation of Japan in an effort to prevent the re-
emergence of pre-war zaibatsu conglomerates because they helped finance much of 
                                                 
4 The U.S. Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Financial Modernization Act) in November 
1999 to allow mutual entry between commercial banks, insurance companies, and securities firms. 
5 Article 65 of the Securities Exchange Act (the equivalent of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 in the U.S.) 
mandates a clear separation between commercial banks and securities firms in Japan. 
6 In addition to the direct effects on the Japanese financial sector described in the text below, the reforms 
also affected the structure and responsibilities of the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance. 
7 A holding company’s principal business is to control the business activities of a company or companies 
by holding a controlling stake. 
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Japan’s war efforts.  Since its inception, the Act had been amended a few times to adapt 
to the changing corporate environment.    
In March 1998, an amendment to the Banking Law, together with an amendment 
to the Anti-monopoly Act, lifted the ban on financial holding companies that control 
other financial institutions through the equity shares of these institutions.  The structure 
of holding companies not only allows mutual entry between banks and securities firms 
but also provides closely related financial institutions of different industries with more 
flexibility in realigning similar lines of business, thereby creating synergies and 
increasing group-wide efficiency.  By now, a financial holding company can control asset 
management companies, banks, investment trust companies, securities firms, and trust 
banks. 
    
B. Foreign Exchange Reform 
 Foreign exchange transactions in Japan had been strictly regulated by the Foreign 
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law dating back to 1949, when Japan’s economy 
recovered slowly from World War II and the government attempted to keep capital from 
fleeing the country.  Until the mid-1990s, only government-authorized banks were 
permitted to conduct currency transactions for companies and individuals, including 
trading companies and securities firms that have frequent needs for currency transactions.  
Starting in April 1998, the amendments to the 1949 Law have eliminated the 
licensing and prior notification requirements for cross-border capital transactions and 
foreign settlements between debts and claims with overseas customers.  Also, authorized 
foreign exchange banks lost their half-century monopoly on changing currencies.  In 
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addition, companies and individuals can freely open bank accounts abroad, from which 
they can settle trades in less restricted foreign markets, make direct settlements in foreign 
currencies, and buy foreign securities from overseas brokerage houses.  The revised law 
basically lets every Japanese individual and company deal with foreign exchange freely.  
These changes represent a fundamental reconsideration of Japan’s foreign exchange 
controls and are viewed as a precursor to the Big Bang plan. 
 
C. Securities-Related Reform 
 To allow securities firms’ entry into the banking industry, since October 1997 
securities firms have been allowed to offer so-called universal (or wrap) accounts where 
customers can deposit paychecks and pay bills and whose returns are tied to the 
performance of stocks, bonds, and other investments.  Also, over-the-counter sales of 
derivative products have been permitted.  To enhance the competition in the brokerage 
industry, commissions on stock trades of more than 50 million yen were deregulated in 
April 1998.  In October 1999, fixed commissions on stock trades of any size were 
completely abolished.8  With market-determined stock-trade commissions and the 
emergence of on-line trading, investors have reaped the benefits of stock trading. 
 
D. Fund Management Reform 
                                                 
8 The U.S. experienced its “Big Bang” on May 1, 1975 (“May Day”), when fixed stock-trade commissions 
were abolished.  In October 1986, the UK scrapped fixed commissions on share transactions. 
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Starting in October 1998, investment advisors have been allowed access to 
corporate pension funds,9 paving a way for the creation of U.S. 401k-style pension plans 
that provide a set of investment choices to pension participants.   
 Since December 1998, the amendments to the Securities and Exchange Law, the 
Banking Law, and other related laws have added more freedom for banks, securities 
companies, and foreign participants.  In particular, regulatory changes have significantly 
opened Japan’s investment trust (mutual fund) industry to foreigners.  Traditionally, 
investment trusts and offshore funds were distributed solely through brokers.  For 
onshore funds, the new rules expand distribution channels and permit the delegation of 
investment management authority to foreigners.  For example, banks and other financial 
institutions are allowed to sell shares of domestic investment trust companies and 
offshore funds at their branches.  Also, incorporated investment trusts (closed-end mutual 
funds), in addition to contractual-type funds, are permitted.  Finally, the registration 
system replaced the licensing system for establishing investment trust and securities 
companies, significantly reducing the amount of regulatory discretion and delay involved.      
As for reforms related to pension plans, the main driving force is that most 
corporate and public pension plans have been underfunded.  There is an urgent need to 
increase the returns of all pension plans in order to support Japan’s workforce, which is 
aging faster than any other in the world.  As a result, restrictions on pension markets have 
been eased gradually.  In 1995, foreign pension advisors gained limited access to a $200 
billion pool of public pension money administered by the Japanese government.  In 
March 1997, foreign pension advisors were allowed greater access to a $170 billion pool 
                                                 
9 According to the Nihon Keizai Shimbun business newspaper, Japan’s corporate pension funds totaled 
about $680 billion (68 trillion yen) as of March 1998.  
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of corporate pension assets.  Since October 2001, defined contribution pension plans, 
similar to 401k-type pension plans in the U.S., have been introduced to allow employees 
to decide on their own how to invest a portion of their pre-tax salaries, typically a fixed 
amount on a monthly basis. 
 
E. Insurance-Industry Reform 
 Deregulation in Japan’s insurance industry started before the November 1996 Big 
Bang announcement.  The revised Insurance Business Law, effective in April 1996, 
permits mutual entry between life and non-life insurance companies via the establishment 
of subsidiaries.  The revised law also allows insurance brokers to act as intermediaries for 
more than one insurer in the provision of policy consultation and risk-management 
services.  In addition, the revised law introduces solvency margin standards for 
monitoring capital adequacy, a policyholder protection scheme, and partial liberalization 
of premium rates.  
 In January 1997, the subsidiaries of life insurance companies were allowed partial 
entry into non-life insurance’s “third sector.”10  Starting in September 1997, the premium 
rates of automobile insurance have been liberalized to reflect the differences in the age, 
gender, residence, and driving history of policyholders.  This is an important step to 
increase competition in the insurance industry because auto-insurance premiums account 
for 40%-60% of non-life insurers’ revenues.  In July 1998, non-life insurers were allowed 
to set freely the premium rates of more policies.  In December 1998, the Life Insurance 
                                                 
10 The third sector refers to the areas not covered by traditional life and non-life insurers, including 
coverage for cancer, general health, injuries, hospitalization, elderly care, and so on.  Non-Japanese 
insurance companies have dominated in this sector. 
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Association of Japan adopted a guarantee system that will honor policies if the issuing 
life insurance company of these policies fails. 
 
F. Financial Reporting Reform 
 In April 1999, new accounting rules were adopted to increase financial disclosure 
about investment losses and risky debt in firms’ affiliates and subsidiaries.  The new rules 
require a parent company to report consolidated financial results of all the companies 
controlled by the parent company, in addition to the unconsolidated financial results of 
the parent company itself.  The design of these new rules is aimed to reduce the 
probability of loss transfer between an affiliate (or subsidiary) and the parent company 
and to allow investors more accurately to evaluate Japanese firms. 
 Starting from April 2000, all companies are required to report the market values 
of their holdings of bonds and stocks, except for long-term equities.  Also, companies are 
required fully to disclose pension-fund assets and liabilities.  Starting in April 2001, 
market value accounting has been applied to the current assets of all companies.   Some 
60% of any paper losses have to be booked as a reduction in retained earnings. 
 According to Pacific Data Co., a consulting company that tracks earnings in 
Japan, the accounting changes have started clarifying earnings statements of many 
Japanese companies.  For instance, Toyota Motor Corp. has begun detailing lease 
transactions.   NEC Corp. revised its way of calculating cash flows so that how money 
flows in from operations is shown more clearly. 
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G. Other Competition-Enhancing Reforms 
 To tear down the walls between banks and securities firms, in December 1997 
banks (and insurance companies) were allowed to rent space in their branches to mutual 
fund companies to sell mutual funds.  Prior to December 1997, securities firms were the 
only channel for sales of mutual funds.  Starting in December 1998, banks have been 
allowed to sell mutual funds developed by themselves.  In October 1997, the brokerage 
subsidiaries of banks were permitted to trade convertible bonds, warrants, warrant bonds, 
stock options, and stock index futures. 
 In sum, a large number of changes in financial regulations have been 
implemented before and after the November 1996 Big Bang announcement.  To cope 
with increased competition, many Japanese financial institutions have repositioned 
themselves and adopted different strategies in response to a new financial environment.  
One major consequence is that there has been a flurry of strategic alliances announced in 
the past few years.  Some alliance examples are explained in Appendix B.    
 
III. Theories; the Nature of Alliances; and Testable Hypotheses 
Miles and Snow (1986) point out that network organizations are an alternative to 
the traditional integrated corporation.  Jensen and Meckling (1991) describe a strategic 
alliance as a network organization under which the coordinating functions of integrated 
firms are combined.  Hence, strategic alliances are inter-corporate, cooperative 
agreements that lie in a continuum, with informal cooperative agreements at one end of 
the spectrum, and mergers and acquisitions at the other end of the spectrum, and many 
different forms between the two extremes.  A good example of an informal cooperative 
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agreement could be an implicit, non-contractual agreement between a bank and an 
insurance company that they will refer customers to each other. 
The resource-based view of the firm suggests that capabilities and resources may 
be heterogeneously distributed across firms.  It is commonly observed that some 
capabilities and resources are usually scarce, imperfectly imitable, and with no direct 
substitutes (Barney, 1991).  In addition, since some resources are either mingled with 
other resources or embedded in organizations, they are not separable and may not be 
transferred perfectly.  As a result, the trading and accumulating of resources becomes 
compulsory, leading to the employment of strategic alliances (Das and Teng, 2000).  
From the perspective of resources, alliances allow a firm access to appropriate 
resources of other firms so that the firm can gain competitive advantages.  In terms of the 
degree of resources committed, informal cooperative agreements can be thought of as the 
weakest form of alliance because few resources are committed while mergers and 
acquisitions are the strongest form of alliance because a merger combines all the 
resources of two companies under one management to achieve some objectives. 
Specifically, we define an alliance as a cooperative, voluntary agreement between 
partner firms involved in the co-development of products, technologies, or services; the 
entrusting of monetary assets; the exchange or sharing of know-how; the joint-marketing 
of products or services; the licensing of products, technologies, or services; the tie-up of 
equity capital; and/or joint ventures.  In the context of this paper, alliances could 
encompass informal cooperative agreements but also extend to cross shareholdings, joint 
ventures, or even comprehensive tie-ups, but exclude mergers and acquisitions; that is, 
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we focus on non-merger and non-acquisition corporate partnerships.  Our sample consists 
solely of financial institutions: banks, insurance companies, and securities firms. 
  
A. Benefits, Costs, and Characteristics of Alliances  
Several previous studies have addressed the benefits and costs of strategic 
alliances.11  First, alliances may lead to knowledge alignment between partner firms.  
Jensen and Meckling (1991) argue that strategic alliances are more cost-effective than 
integrated corporations because they can add more value to the partner firms by better 
aligning decision-making authority with decision knowledge.  Jensen and Meckling, 
however, note that the knowledge transfer of some specific information may be costly.  
Chesbrough and Teece (1996) point out that general or codified information such as non-
technical data can be transmitted easily and inexpensively, whereas tacit information may 
be difficult to transfer between firms.  An example in the financial services industry 
would be the deal-making (e.g., mergers and acquisitions) know-how of an investment 
banker or a group of investment bankers whose knowledge cannot be acquired easily by 
others in a short period of time.  Another cost in transferring information between firms is 
the possibility that rival firms may acquire competitively sensitive information from any 
of allied firms.       
Second, alliances provide organizational flexibilities.  A merger combines two 
independent companies into a single one by joining together all the resources of two 
companies.  Once the new company is formed, it would be costly to do a de-merger if 
                                                 
11 In addition to the studies mentioned in the text, further discussion and evidence can be found in Berg and 
Friedman (1978, 1981), Duncan (1982), Harrigan (1985), Kogut (1988), Barney (1991), Lorange and Roos 
(1992), Bleeke and Ernst (1995), Yoshino and Rangan (1995), Kranton (1996), Mohanram and Nanda 
(1996), Gulati (1998), and Elmuti and Kathawala (2001). 
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things go wrong.  In contrast, strategic alliances provide organizational flexibilities in that 
firms with similar interests can form links easily relative to mergers/acquisitions, which 
often require lengthy pre-merger negotiations and costly post-merger execution.12
Also, when market conditions become unfavorable, an alliance can be disbanded 
quickly.  Jensen (1993) argues that network organizations or alliances are a natural 
strategic response to the difficulties encountered in fully integrating resources from firms.  
Mody (1993) suggests that with the organizational flexibility, strategic alliances facilitate 
experimentation with new combinations of partner firms in the pursuit of marketing 
strategies or new technologies.  We argue that a company may form an alliance in order 
to establish more future alliances with the same or different companies.  In other words, 
alliances are relationship-building and -investing strategies that increase the mutual 
understanding of partner firms and hence reduce transaction costs.   It is also possible that 
an alliance between two partner firms may be the catalyst for a higher-degree of alliance 
such as a merger or acquisition.  In this sense, an alliance may be considered as the 
“dating” stage, which may lead to the “marriage” status (i.e., merger or acquisition) in the 
future.  In our sample, the initial trust-business alliance between Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, 
Fuji Bank, and Yasuda Trust & Banking eventually resulted in a joint holding company. 
Third, alliances can circumvent antitrust regulations.  A merger or acquisition 
between two financial institutions is usually subject to regulatory approval because the 
financial services industry is heavily regulated in virtually all countries.  Such a merger 
or acquisition can also raise anticompetitive concerns.  In contrast, a strategic alliance can 
mitigate these regulatory and public-concern issues, thereby reducing the cost associated 
                                                 
12 However in the presence of open exit opportunities and strong competition, enforceability of such 
strategic alliances is a key issue in determining the efficiency of the alliance.  
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with regulatory uncertainty.  In fact, unlike the U.S. where financial-institution mergers 
are frequent,13 mergers in Japan’s financial services sector have been rare until recently, 
in part because of regulatory hurdles. 
Fourth, we argue that alliances may be a defensive or even survival strategy.  
Deregulation tends to induce more competition and usually consolidation as well.  When 
some companies in one industry have formed alliances to gain competitive advantages in 
the wake of deregulation, this puts pressures on other companies that do not have alliance 
partners.  As a consequence, more companies in the industry will enter alliances of 
different types in order to survive and better compete.  If a company acts too late, the 
choice of suitable partners may be limited, resulting in some disadvantages for the 
company.  This could explain what has happened in Japan’s financial services sector after 
the November 1996 announcement of the Big Bang financial reforms.  Therefore, when 
the regulatory environment changes, alliances may become an urgently needed strategy.  
In this sense, alliances could be “contagious.”   
Fifth, alliances usually incur some costs that are not incurred in the integrated 
firm.  These costs arise mainly from the potential opportunistic behavior by the alliance-
forging firms.  To deter opportunistic behavior, partner firms need to spend extra time 
and money looking for reliable partners, designing appropriate contracts, and monitoring 
the behavior of each other.  Parkhe (1993) argues that when a current alliance may lead to 
more cooperative agreements between partner firms in the future, opportunistic behavior 
may be contained.  However, the opportunistic behavior between established partner 
firms may not be a serious problem if this behavior is verifiable.   The reason is that by 
                                                 
13 It should be noted that the U.S. has had a large number of banking mergers because of the existence of a 
large number of banks and easy entry; despite over 10,000 bank mergers between 1980 and 1998, there 
were 8,774 banks in the U.S. at year-end 1998.  By contrast, Japan had only about 200 banks as of 1998. 
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behaving opportunistically, a partner firm may suffer a reputational loss because it will 
reduce the trustworthiness of the firm.  This, in turn, may hurt the future profits of the 
firm.14
 
B. The Nature of Financial Services, and Alliance Examples 
 One major difference between a product market and a financial market is that the 
prices of most financial products or securities are market-determined and these prices 
keep changing.  Therefore, risk is one of important elements in financial services.  The 
nature of financial services has led financial institutions to collaborate in a large number 
of business areas, even though the same financial institutions may also compete fiercely 
with each other.  In fact, financial institutions are often simultaneously rivals, partners, 
and customers to each other.  By closely examining the activity of financial institutions, 
we find that strategic alliances among financial institutions are, in fact, abundant.  We 
classify some common alliances into two categories: “transaction-based” and 
“unavoidable”.   We also discuss some special types of alliances observed between 
Japanese financial institutions. 
  
B.1.  Transaction-Based Alliances 
 One popular form of alliance in the securities industry is syndicated underwriting.  
Investment banks play an important role in the capital-raising process by offering advice on 
the type of securities to be sold, the size of the issue, the features of the securities, the 
distribution channel of the issue, the price, the timing of the sale, and so on.  To resell new 
                                                 
14 However, the more costly is the verification or the enforcement of an agreement contingent on 
verification, the weaker will be the enforcement effects of reputation. 
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securities quickly for a profit and reduce the underwriting risk, the lead underwriter 
normally invites other investment banks to form a syndicate, or group of investment banks.  
Moreover, the underwriting syndicate often expands the syndicated alliance by including 
other securities companies to form a selling group that distributes newly issued securities to 
investors.  Although a syndicated alliance is normally transaction-based, the large number 
of securities offerings has made syndicated underwriting a form of repeated alliances 
between many securities companies. 
Another frequently observed alliance is loan syndication, which is normally 
arranged by a group of major commercial banks (and investment banks) and is 
particularly popular in international lending.15  Typically, a small group of informed and 
well-capitalized banks agree to provide a relatively large loan to a government or large 
corporation.  These banks, called lead banks, may then sell portions of the entire loan to a 
wide range of smaller banks (and other financial institutions). 
  
B.2.  Unavoidable Alliances 
 The nature of financial transactions also has led financial institutions to cooperate 
in areas such as money transfer, payment system, securities clearing and settlement, and 
so on.  The cooperation is, indeed, “unavoidable” because any financial institution is 
normally involved in numerous daily transactions with many other financial institutions.  
The payment system is a good example. 
Japan’s payment system has been established to meet the preference of the 
majority of Japanese who favor cash transactions.  At the center of the payment system 
                                                 
15 Major investment banks such as Goldman Sachs are also important players in the syndicated-loan 
market.   For simplicity, we focus on commercial banks only. 
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are Japanese banks.  The network systems of participating banks are inter-connected 
through a shared industry network for each financial industry sector.  Among three 
industry networks, the Bank of Japan Financial Network System (BOJ-NET) is for large-
value funds, the Zengin system for retail payments, and the MICS for ATM networks.  
The purpose of the payment-system alliance between participating banks is to reduce 
operating costs, provide real-time online processing services, and reduce the overall 
settlement risk.16
 Securities companies also have to cooperate in some areas such as securities 
clearing and settlement in order to make financial transactions smooth.  The clearing and 
settlement procedure for securities trades involves trade comparison, trade netting, book-
entry settlement, and money transfer.  Without a centralized clearing organization, trade 
clearing and settlement would not be efficient.  To facilitate the clearance and settlement 
of securities trades, financial institutions often establish jointly a clearing house.  In 
Japan, the Japan Securities Clearing Corporation (JSCC, a subsidiary of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (TSE)) is in charge of the book-entry settlement for all stocks listed on the TSE 
while the money settlement is completed through the Bank of Japan and TSE-designated 
settling banks.  The JSCC is just an alliance between major securities companies.17   
 In sum, we observe that the nature of financial services or transactions leads 
financial institutions to form alliances of various types.  The cooperative and coordinated 
                                                 
16 There are similar payment systems in the U.S.  Large-amount fund transfers are accomplished through 
the Federal Reserve’s FedWire system and through the Clearing House Interbank Payments System 
(CHIPS), which was originally organized by major U.S. banks to process international payments.  An 
example of international cooperation is in fund transfers between international banks and other institutions, 
which are accomplished through an electronic message transmittal system, called the Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT, headquartered in Brussels, Belgium). 
17 Similarly, in the U.S., the trading of corporate bonds, equities, and municipal debt is ultimately processed 
by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC), which is an alliance between member financial 
institutions (see http://www.dtcc.com). 
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activities between financial institutions in payment systems, securities clearing and 
settlement, and other areas can be thought of as unavoidable and silent alliances, because 
financial institutions need to participate in an efficient money-transfer or post-trading 
system in order to handle numerous transactions and because these alliances have gone 
little noticed and moved on quietly for a long period of time. 
  
B.3.  Existing Japanese-Style Alliances18
 Corporate Japan has long been known for its bank-dominated corporate financing 
and governance system, in which firms borrow most funds from banks and banks play an 
active and unique role in corporate governance.  Among many distinguished features, the 
main bank system and corporate grouping are the most noticeable. 
 Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard (1994) define the main bank system in Japan as “a 
system of corporate financing and governance involving an informal set of practices, 
institutional arrangements, and behaviors among industrial and commercial firms, banks 
of various types, other financial institutions, and the regulatory authorities.”  They 
characterize the main bank system as a nexus of relationships, consisting of three major 
elements: (1) financial, informational, and managerial relationships between a typical 
Japanese firm and its main bank; (2) non-contractual, reciprocal relationships among 
major banks and other financial institutions; (3) cozy and conflicting relationships 
between the banking industry and regulatory authorities, namely, the Bank of Japan and 
the Ministry of Finance.  In Japan, the main bank of a firm (or group of firms) normally 
provides the largest share of funds to the firm, holds equity in the firm, and performs the 
                                                 
18 Some specific examples of some of the types of alliances discussed in the text can be found in the 
Appendix. 
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functions of monitoring and governance.  In the eyes of financial-market participants and 
regulators, which bank is the main bank to which firm is generally clear and recognized. 
Another institutional feature of the Japanese financial system is the formation of 
keiretsu, or corporate groupings.  In a typical financial or horizontal keiretsu (bank-
centered corporate group), there are usually a major city bank (as the main bank to other 
group members), some financial institutions (insurance companies, securities companies 
and/or trust banks), a trading company, and firms from diverse industries.  All group-
affiliated firms are connected by interlocking shareholdings, main bank relationships with 
the same bank, varying degrees of reciprocal business transactions, and memberships in a 
presidents’ club. 
 The characterization of the main bank system by Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard (1994) 
as a nexus of relationships indicates some distinguished institutional features of Japan’s 
financial system.  We argue that most observed relationships in the main bank system and 
corporate groups are, indeed, a bundle or nexus of strategic alliances, which are bilateral 
or multi-lateral, non-contractual, implicit, multi-dimensional, and long-term in nature. 
Since our paper is about financial-institution alliances, we will discuss these alliances 
only. 
 First, there are alliances in information-sharing.  Financial institutions in each of 
six major bank-centered corporate groups (horizontal keiretsu) constantly exchange 
information about group-affiliated firms and developments in the business world.  These 
same financial institutions also participate in a monthly meeting, called the presidents’ 
club, in which the executives of all group-affiliated firms may discuss current business 
issues, share their experiences, and, possibly, jointly agree on something that is in 
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everybody’s interest.  As reported in the financial press, meetings of the presidents’ clubs 
have become less formal in recent years.  Even if this is the case, we expect this type of 
alliance will continue in the future.   Also, a main bank may share some information 
about a client firm with other non-main banks that lend money to the client firm.  
 Second, there are equity tie-up alliances between financial institutions.  In each of 
six largest financial keiretsu, financial institutions hold each other’s shares as well as the 
shares of group-affiliated firms.  According to the Kigyo Keiretsu Soran 1998 (Directory 
of Corporate Affiliations), there are four financial institutions in the Fuyo financial 
keiretsu, in which (1) Fuji Bank held a 3.94% stake of Yasuda Trust & Banking and a 
4.99% stake of Yasuda Fire & Marine Co.; (2) Yasuda Trust & Banking held a 2.18% 
stake of Fuji Bank and a 3.88% stake of Yasuda Fire & Marine Co.; and (3) Yasuda Fire 
& Marine Co. held a 4.89% stake of Fuji Bank, a 4.05% stake of Yasuda Trust & 
Banking, and a 3.59% stake of Yasuda Fire & Marine Co.  This type of equity tie-up can 
be viewed as an intra-keiretsu alliance.  Similar shareholding patterns can also be 
observed five other large financial keiretsu. 
 In addition, there are inter-keiretsu alliances in that financial institutions of 
different financial keiretsu normally are joint top shareholders of some large companies 
and their shareholdings tend to be stable over time.   For example, Nippon Steel Corp., 
one of the largest steel makers in the world, had, as of March 1997, 16 Japanese financial 
institutions as top 20 shareholders, including 4 financial institutions that belong to the 
Sakura Bank-centered financial keiretsu.  Some other large Japanese companies also have 
a similar structure of shareholdings. 
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 Third, there is coordinated lending activity between Japanese financial 
institutions.  Although bank loans in Japan are usually bilateral in that a company 
borrows directly from a bank, a typical company tends to borrow from a few different 
banks with the main bank having the largest loan share.  It is not uncommon that the main 
bank will cooperate with other banks to lend to a company. 
However, this practice is not in the form of syndicated loans as discussed earlier, 
but non-contractual coordinated lending.  Syndicated loans are still relatively rare for 
Japanese lenders,19 which traditionally extend credit singly to companies with which they 
have close ties.  The volume of syndicated loans in Japan stood at about $4 billion in 
1998 and grew to about $37 billion in 1999.  In contrast, the 1999 U.S. volume was about 
$1.017 trillion, which is about 27.5 times the comparable volume in Japan. 
In the wake of drastic deregulation and economic hard times, Japanese banks have 
started to move from the main bank system to project financing through a team of banks, 
where repayments are often based on the returns from the project.  Recently, syndicated 
loans have become more common in Japan as banks want to reduce credit risk as well as 
to earn arrangement and commitment fees. 
Fourth, there are alliances between major banks in monitoring firm borrowers.  
While a typical Japanese firm borrows from a few different banks, the main bank usually 
has the largest loan share.  Therefore, the main bank traditionally assumes the principal 
responsibility for monitoring the firm.  In practice, because other non-main banks do not 
monitor the firm with the same intensity, they actually delegate the monitoring task to the 
                                                 
19 For example, Asahi Bank, one of the major city banks in Japan, arranged its first ever syndicated loan of 
about $90 million for Sanken Electric Co. in November 2000. 
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main bank.  This relationship is termed “reciprocal delegated monitoring” in Sheard 
(1994).    
 
C. Hypotheses 
Overall, alliances are a less costly way for the participating firms to gain partial 
access to each other’s resources and enter new markets while avoiding the expenses 
incurred when one firm acquires another.  Although alliances can result from wide-
ranging motives and objectives, have benefits and costs, and take a variety of forms, it is 
reasonable to assume that the purpose of an alliance is to enhance competitive advantages 
of partner firms, and that the ultimate goal of any alliance is to increase shareholder 
wealth.  Based on our previous discussion, we propose the following hypotheses: 
First, similar to a typical merger that represents the combination of all the 
resources of two firms under a single management to accomplish some goals, an alliance 
is a partnership between participating firms that pool together some subsets of their own 
resources to reap the benefits of a larger customer base, economies of scale, resource 
complementarity, increased market power, improved production techniques, improved 
marketing opportunities, the redeployment of assets to more profitable uses and so on. 
Therefore, we expect an overall gain from a strategic alliance.  As in mergers or 
acquisitions, we refer to this likely outcome as the synergy hypothesis.   
 Second, in a typical acquisition or merger, the acquiring firm usually pays a 
premium to get the approval from the board of the target firm.  As a result, the 
shareholders of the target firm tend to gain substantially, often at the expense of the 
shareholders of the acquiring firm.  Therefore, the hubris hypothesis of corporate 
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mergers, proposed by Roll (1986), posits that the gains to target-firm shareholders could 
be due to wealth transfers from the shareholders of the acquiring firm, not necessarily 
from synergistic gains.  Unlike an acquisition or merger, however, an alliance is a 
voluntary, cooperative agreement between the partners who foresee benefits of forming 
such an alliance.  If one partner is likely to be negatively affected through an alliance, 
there seems to be no point for this partner to enter into the alliance because doing nothing 
is just better (and there are fewer of the managerial advantages, such as greater size of 
institution and more perquisites, that are a large part of the hubris hypothesis).  Therefore, 
all partners of an alliance should expect to gain.  We refer to this expectation as the win-
win situation (or non-hubris) hypothesis. 
Third, partner firms may benefit differently.  According to the relative size 
hypothesis in McConnell and Nantell (1985), the abnormal return of the smaller partner 
in a joint venture should be larger than that of the larger partner, but the monetary value 
of their gains should be approximately equal.  Because joint ventures are a subset of 
strategic alliances in our paper, the relative size hypothesis may hold – at least, in its 
weaker form (i.e., that the smaller partner’s abnormal return should be greater than the 
larger partner’s), if not in its stronger form (i.e., that the monetary value of the gains of 
the partners should be about the same). 
 Fourth, in the past twenty years, Japanese banks have played a major role in the 
international syndicated or bank-loan market. Japanese financial institutions also have 
been key players in the euro-yen credit market.  However, Japanese financial institutions 
have lagged behind their Western counterparts in areas such as asset management, 
financial engineering, financial technologies, global merger and acquisition advisory 
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services, and international underwritings.  For example, for announced global merger and 
acquisition deals in 1999, Goldman Sachs of the U.S. ranked first, lead-advising 340 
deals with a total value of about $1.12 trillion (Bloomberg News).  By comparison, 
Nomura Securities of Japan ended in twentieth place (the best among Japanese financial 
institutions), brokering only eight deals (2.35% of Goldman’s total) valued at about 
$45.42 billion (4% of Goldman’s).  Therefore, for a similar type of alliance, we expect 
that a domestic/foreign alliance should add more value than would a domestic/domestic 
alliance, all else being equal.  This is referred to as the foreign institution superior 
hypothesis.  
 Finally, as we discussed earlier, group-affiliated (keiretsu) firms have had 
alliances in information-sharing, cross-shareholding, and so on.  If a strategy can increase 
the value of some group-affiliated firms, it may well have been already exploited in some 
way.  Therefore, the announcement of an inter-group alliance should be expected by the 
market to yield larger returns than should the announcement of an intra-group alliance, all 
else being equal.  We refer to this notion as the inter-group synergy hypothesis. 
 
IV. Data, Methodology, and Results 
A. Sample Description  
 We have identified a sample of strategic alliance (te-kei in Japanese) 
announcements involving Japanese financial institutions over the period 1997-1999 by 
carefully reading through three major Japanese newspapers: Nihon Keizai Shimbun 
(Japan Economic Journal), Nikkei Interactive Net, and Yomiuri Shimbun.  This search 
resulted in a total of 258 announcements.  Since our focus is on financial institutions, we 
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restricted observations to those alliances that involve only banks, insurance companies, 
and securities firms.  Therefore, an alliance between a financial firm and a non-financial 
firm was excluded.  To be included in the sample, we also require that at least one 
Japanese financial firm involved in each alliance be traded on the Osaka or Tokyo Stock 
Exchange.  Finally, we checked for contaminating news over the (day –3, day +1) 
window. To avoid concurrent effects of some other firm-specific events, we dropped 
observations that were related to such news as bond/credit rating changes, corporate 
control affairs, dividends, earnings, financing arrangements, legal affairs, loan loss 
reserves, or share repurchases.  After applying the above criteria, our primary sample 
consists of 109 clean announcements, involving 169 publicly traded Japanese financial 
institutions. 
 Table 1 presents the sample observations by time of announcement.  Most 
announcements were made in the period of 1998 Q2 to 1999 Q1, with the largest number 
of announcements in 1998 Q4.  In Table 2, we classify each alliance announcement into 
one of three categories: (1) single-business alliance if only one line of business is 
involved in the alliance (single-business dummy variable = 1); (2) multiple-business 
alliance if two or three lines of business are involved in the alliance (multiple-business 
dummy variable = 1); and (3) comprehensive-business alliance if it involves a wide-
ranging business tie-up or full-scale consolidation in a line of business (comprehensive-
business dummy variable = 1). For example, a consolidation of securities businesses 
between two partner firms is considered to be a comprehensive-business alliance.  There 
are 80 single-business alliances (73.39%), 20 multiple-business alliances (18.45%), and 9 
comprehensive-business alliances (8.26%), respectively. 
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 B. Methodology 
 Following the conventional event-study methodology, we use the market model to 
obtain the estimates of abnormal stock returns of the sample firms around the 
announcements of strategic alliances.20  The abnormal return is computed by subtracting 
the expected (or predicted) return from the realized (or actual) return for each 
announcement.  The estimation period of the market model begins from day -219 and 
ends on day -20, totaling 200 trading days.  Event day 0 is the day on which the 
announcement of an alliance was made.  For most announcements, we can clearly 
identify the exact announcement time and date.  Hence, our primary focus is on the 
announcement effect on day 0.  It is, however, possible that there was information 
leakage before the announcement; we therefore also use a two-day window (day -1, day 
0) to measure the impact of the announcement on the stock price of a sample firm.  We 
refer to the two-day window as the (day -1, day 0) announcement period. 
 In calculating the test statistics employed in most event studies, cross-sectional 
independence of returns is assumed.  If the events are contemporaneous, then the 
assumption may be violated.  Because an alliance in our sample may involve more than 
one firm, cross-sectional independence of returns may not hold.  To correct for this 
potential problem, we form an equally weighted portfolio using the common stocks of 
firms in the same alliance.  Then, the portfolio is treated as a single “security” in 
conducting the statistical analysis.  Therefore, although 169 firms are represented in our 
sample, the full sample includes only 109 “securities.” 
                                                 
20 See, for example, Brown and Warner (1985) and Barber and Lyon (1996). 
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 To evaluate how other variables affect the abnormal return, we record, if 
available, the following characteristics associated with each alliance: (1) if it is a 
domestic firm/foreign firm alliance (d/f dummy variable = 1); (2) if it is an alliance 
between firms within the same business (keiretsu) group (intra-group dummy variable = 
1); (3) if an alliance is formed between firms from different business (keiretsu) groups 
(inter-group dummy variable = 1); (4) if an alliance involves an equity tie-up (capital tie-
up dummy variable = 1); (5) if an alliance involves the insurance business (insurance 
dummy variable = 1); (6) if an alliance involves investment products (e.g., mutual funds) 
(investment product dummy variable = 1); (7) if an alliance involves asset management 
(e.g., pension funds) (asset management dummy variable = 1); (8) if an alliance involves 
the investment banking business (investment banking dummy variable = 1); (9) if the 
business involved in an alliance cannot be classified as one of (5), (6), (7), or (8) 
(“others” dummy variable = 1).   It should be noted that while an alliance cannot be intra-
group as well as inter-group, some of these dummy variables are not mutually exclusive.  
For example, an alliance could involve inter-group firms, asset management, and 
investment banking. 
 Table 3 shows the frequencies of the nine dummy variables.  The domestic 
firm/foreign firm alliance, with a frequency of 60, is the most common characteristic, 
followed by the equity tie-up with a frequency of 52 and the investment-product alliance 
with a frequency of 37.  Also, there are 24 alliances in asset management, 20 in other 
business, 17 between intra-group firms, 9 in insurance business, 7 in investment banking, 
and 5 between firms from different business groups, respectively.  The popularity of the 
domestic firm/foreign firm alliance may be a manifestation of the foreign-institution-
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superior hypothesis: all else being equal, domestic firms prefer to team up with foreign 
firms in the hopes of enhancing their competitiveness.  
 
C. Results 
 The hypotheses developed in Section III.C can be summarized as follows: 
 (1) The “synergy” hypothesis: Strategic alliances should be expected to yield 
value for their members, which should be reflected in positive abnormal returns at the 
time of the announcement of the alliance. 
 (2) The “win-win” hypothesis:  All of the partners of an alliance should expect to 
gain; i.e., all of the partners should expect positive abnormal returns at the time of the 
announcement. 
 (3) The “relative size” hypothesis:  The smaller members of the alliance will show 
the larger percentage gains at the time of the announcement. 
 (4) The “foreign institution superior” hypothesis: A domestic/foreign alliance 
should add more value than would a domestic/domestic alliance (all else being equal), 
and thus the abnormal returns for d/f alliances should be larger. 
 (5) The “inter-group synergy” hypothesis:  Inter-group alliances should yield 
more value than intra-group alliances, and thus the former’s abnormal returns should be 
higher. 
 We will discuss the results and their implications for each hypothesis in turn. 
 
C.1. The “synergy” hypothesis 
 Table 4 reports that the (day –1, day 0) average abnormal return is +2.87%, which 
 31
is significantly different from 0 at the 1% level.  Further, the median value is +1.39%, 
which is again significantly different from 0 at the 1% level.  Finally, of the 109 “events” 
in our sample, 75 (68.8%) had positive abnormal returns and only 34 (31.2%) had 
negative positive returns, which is significantly different from the random (50%/50%) 
outcome at the 1% level. 
All of these outcomes are consistent with the synergy hypothesis that a strategic 
alliance, similar to a merger or acquisition, generally creates value. 
 
C.2. The “win-win” hypothesis  
 To test this hypothesis, we focus on the 37 alliances that involved solely domestic 
Japanese financial services firms (d/f = 0) and for which abnormal returns data are 
available for two or more firms.21  Table 5 shows the distribution of domestic-domestic 
alliances by numbers of participating firms for which abnormal returns data are available, 
and the signs of their returns.  As can be seen, for the 26 domestic-domestic alliances for 
which there were only two publicly traded firms, 13 (50%) had positive abnormal returns 
for both firms.  This outcome is significantly different from the randomly expected 
outcome (25%) at the 1% level.22  The outcomes from the three-firm and four-firm 
distributions are not significantly different from random outcomes.  Nevertheless, the 
two-firm outcomes do point strongly toward the result that alliances tend (more than 
randomly) to provide benefits for all of their members.23
                                                 
21 There were 49 alliances that involved only domestic Japanese firms, but in 10 of these alliances only one 
of the alliance partners was a publicly traded firm for which abnormal returns data could be collected. 
22 Also, a chi-square test on the overall frequency of the three outcomes shows that they are significantly 
different from the randomly expected outcome at the 5% level. 
23 There appears to be no straightforward way to combine the two-firm, three-firm, and four-firm outcomes 
to provide an overall test.  However, if we simply examine the pattern of abnormal returns for the 93 firms 
that were involved in these domestic alliances, there were 56 (60.2%) that had positive returns, which is 
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 C.3. The “relative size” hypothesis 
 We again will focus on the group of domestic-domestic alliance announcements.  
In Table 6 we extend the outcomes from Table 5 to ask whether the smaller firm in any 
given alliance (as measured by the reported assets of the firm, at the time of the 
announcement) showed larger gains than did the larger firm.  For the alliances with two 
firms’ abnormal returns, the smaller firm showed the superior gain in 15 of the 26 
announcements.24  For the 11 alliances with three firms’ abnormal returns, if we examine 
the returns of the largest and the smallest of the three, the smallest showed better returns 
in 6 of the announcements.  Finally, for the 2 alliances with four firms’ abnormal returns, 
the smallest firm showed better returns than the largest firm in one of the announcements.  
Overall, more than a majority -- 22 out of the 39 alliances -- showed the smaller firms’ 
having the higher returns; but the results are not significantly different from what we 
would observe by chance. 
However, when we observe the sizes of the differences in abnormal returns 
between the smaller and larger firms within an alliance, a more systematic pattern 
emerges.  Of the 26 alliances with two firms’ abnormal returns, the 15 announcements 
where the smaller firm had superior returns showed a mean difference between the small 
and large firms’ returns of +5.23%; the 11 announcements where the larger firm had 
                                                                                                                                                 
significantly different from the 50% expectation at the 5% level.  This result tends to support the 2-firm 
result.  Also, this result, along with the fact that the overall mean of the domestic alliance abnormal returns 
(including the alliances for which there is only a single publicly traded firm) was 3.13% (and significantly 
different from 0 at the 1% level), shows that the domestic alliances tracked the overall sample in supporting 
the “synergy” hypothesis. 
24 These 15 instances were distributed as follows: The smaller firm showed greater abnormal returns in 7 of 
the 13 announcements where both firms showed positive returns; the smaller firm showed the positive gain 
in 7 of the 9 announcements where the two firms’ abnormal returns were split in sign; and the smaller firm 
showed a smaller loss in 1 of the 4 announcements where both firms’ abnormal returns were negative. 
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superior returns showed a mean difference between the large and small firms’ returns of 
only +2.62%. 
 Similarly, when we examine the 11 alliances with three firms’ abnormal returns, 
the 6 announcements where the smallest firm’s abnormal returns were better than the 
returns of the largest firm showed a mean difference of +5.10% in favor of the smaller 
firm; the 5 announcements where the largest firm’s abnormal returns were better than the 
returns of the smaller firm showed a mean difference of only +3.37% in favor of the 
larger firm.  Finally, for the 2 alliances with four firms’ abnormal returns, for one 
announcement the smaller firm’s returns were superior to the larger firm’s by 12.70%, 
while for the other announcement the larger firm’s abnormal returns were superior to the 
smaller firm’s by 0.55%. 
 When we combine all of these results for all 39 domestic-domestic alliances, we 
find that for the 22 announcements where the smaller firm showed superior abnormal 
returns, the mean difference was +5.53% (with a standard error of 1.51); for the 17 
announcements where the larger firm showed superior abnormal returns, the mean 
difference was only +2.72% (with a standard error of 0.64).  The difference between the 
two means is significant at the 10% level. 
 Thus, though the simple count of which announcements yielded superior 
abnormal returns for the smallest firm in the alliance does not yield a pattern that is 
significantly different from what would be expected randomly, the sizes of the 
differences in abnormal returns do show a systematic pattern.  For the announcements 
where the smaller firm shows superior abnormal returns, the size of the average 
differential in returns significantly exceeds the size of the average differential for the 
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announcements where the larger firm shows superior returns.  Thus, this measure of the 
sizes of the differentials does provide support for the “weak” form of the “relative size” 
hypothesis. 
 
C.4 The “foreign institution superior” hypothesis 
In Table 7 the entire sample is divided into two sub-samples, d/f = 1 and d/f = 0.  
The (day –1, day 0) average abnormal return of the d/f = 1 sub-sample is 2.65%, lower 
than that (3.13%) of the d/f = 0 sub-sample.  While both average abnormal returns are 
significantly different from 0 at the 1% level, the larger average AR for the domestic-
domestic alliance announcements is not consistent with the foreign institution superior 
hypothesis.25  When we compare the (day –1, day 0) median abnormal returns of the two 
sub-samples, the d/f = 1 sub-sample has the larger median, which is consistent with our 
expectation that a domestic-foreign alliance generally generates a higher abnormal return 
than a domestic-domestic alliance; but the difference in the medians of the two sub-
samples is not significant. 
To examine further the cross-sectional differences in the abnormal returns for 
alliance announcements to determine whether other influences may be affecting the 
pattern of returns observed for the domestic-foreign and domestic-domestic alliances, we 
introduce various alliance characteristics (expressed as dummy variables) as additional 
explanatory variables in regressions in which the alliance ARs are the dependent 
                                                 
25 One large abnormal return among the domestic alliance announcements, with a return of 37.5%, clearly 
has an influence on these results. (The next highest abnormal return in the overall sample is 19.1%.) If this 
announcement is considered an “outlier” and is removed, then the average abnormal return for the 
remaining d/f =0 sub-sample is 2.41%, which is lower than the 2.65% average abnormal return for the 
d/f=1 sub-sample; this simple difference in (corrected) means is consistent with our expectations.  The 
difference in these sub-sample means, however, is not statistically significant. 
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variables.26   We run the following three sets of regressions:27
(1) Abnormal returni = αi+ β1i(d/f)+ β2i(intra-group)+ β3i(inter-group) 
                                          + β4i(capital tie-up)+ β5i(insurance) 
                                          + β6i(investment product) + β7i (asset management) 
                                          + β8i(investment banking) + β9i (others); 
(2) Abnormal returni = αi+ β1i(d/f)+ β2i(intra-group)+ β3i(inter-group) 
                                    + β4i(capital tie-up)+ β10i(multiple-business) 
+β11i(comprehensive-business);28 and 
(3) Abnormal returni = f(combined variables from regressions (1) & (2)), 
where i is the ith observation or announcement (109 alliance announcements in total) and 
all betas on the right-hand side are the coefficients on the dummy variables as described 
in Parts A and B of this section. 
 Table 8 reports the results of these regressions.  For all of the regressions, the 
coefficient on the d/f variable is insignificantly different from zero.  Even when other 
influences are taken into account, the “foreign firm superior” hypothesis is not 
supported.29
                                                 
26 Because the ARs themselves are estimated values, with standard errors, their use as a dependent variable 
introduces the possibility of heteroskedasticity into the regression.  To correct for this, we use weighted 
least squares, where the weights for each observation are the inverse of the standard error of each AR, as 
suggested by Saxonhouse (1976).  Another possible method is to standardize just the ARs themselves by 
their standard errors (i.e., use standardized prediction errors, or “SPEs”).  Accordingly, we also conducted 
regressions using the SPEs as the dependent variable.  Those results (unreported) are largely similar to the 
results reported in Table 8. 
27 In addition to the reported regressions, we also ran regressions (unreported) that included six-month time 
period dummy variables (second-half of 1997, first-half of 1998, etc.).  Though these time-period dummy 
variables tended to be significant, they did not affect the other results appreciably. 
28 In this regression, the single-business category is the “base case” (since the sum of the single-business, 
multiple-business, and comprehensive-business categories sum to 1.0). 
29 We are unsure as to why the “foreign firm superior” hypothesis fails to be supported by the data.  One 
possibility is the problem of self-selection bias.  To the extent that firms have discretion as to which 
alliances they will announce to the public (and they care about the market reaction), they will tend to 
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When we examine the other coefficients, we find that the intra-group alliance has 
a negative effect on the standardized abnormal return, and the coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 5% level in the first two regressions.  The insurance and investment-
product alliance variables also have negative effects on standardized returns, with 
significance levels of 10% and 5%, respectively, in the third regression. 
By contrast, the investment-banking alliance is associated with a strong positive 
effect, with a coefficient that is significant at the 5% level in the first regression.   One of 
the major consequences of the Big Bang reforms has been increased competition so that 
Japanese companies are more willing to sell or close money-losing operations.   
According to the Wall Street Journal (April 23, 2001, A17), the value of Japan’s M&A 
market compared to the size of its stock market is probably the lowest among developed 
countries.  The value of mergers in 2000 totaled about 4% of Japan’s stock-market 
capitalization, compared with 16% in the European Union and 21% in the U.S.  The 
growth potential of the investment banking business in Japan may contribute to the 
favorable reactions from the stock market in response to investment-banking alliances. 
 
C.5 The “inter-group synergy” hypothesis  
 In the regression results of Table 8, the coefficient on the intra-group variable is 
always negative and is significantly different from zero in the first two of the regressions, 
whereas the coefficient on the inter-group variable is always positive (although it is never 
                                                                                                                                                 
announce only those about which they have greater confidence as to the market’s favorable reaction.  This 
flexibility in announcement may not apply equally to domestic-foreign alliances and to domestic-domestic 
alliances.  In the former case, the foreign partner’s securities laws may mandate disclosure if the alliance is 
considered to be a “material event” (e.g., as is true for U.S. securities law), thus reducing discretion.  If this 
is true, then the self-selection may apply more strongly to the domestic-domestic alliances, thus biasing 
their outcomes upward. 
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significantly different from zero).  Thus, controlling for other influences, the market 
reacts more favorably (or less unfavorably) to the announcements of inter-group alliances 
than to the announcements of intra-group alliances. 
These results are supported by the simple mean differences in the abnormal 
returns for the two kinds of alliances.  In Table 9 we present the mean abnormal returns 
for the 17 announcements of intra-group alliances and the 5 announcements of inter-
group alliances.  As can be seen, the former set of alliances had a mean abnormal return 
of +0.58%; the latter set of alliances had a mean abnormal return of +4.55%. 
Thus, as expected, the inter-group alliance announcements yield higher abnormal 
returns than do the intra-group alliance announcements – because of the market’s likely 
expectations that the latter alliance announcements are (in a sense) redundant. 
 
 
C.6 A summing up 
 In Section III we put forward five hypotheses concerning the likely pattern of 
abnormal returns that would be found in connection of the announcements of alliances 
involving Japanese financial services firms: (1) the “synergy” hypothesis; (2) the “win-
win” hypothesis; (3) the “relative size” hypothesis; (4) the “foreign institution superior” 
hypothesis; and (5) the “inter-group synergy” hypothesis.  In this section we have tested 
these hypotheses on a sample of alliance announcements between 1997 and 1999.  We 
find general support for all of them except the “foreign institution superior” hypothesis.  
Alliances do seem to be favorably received (“synergy”); the gains are spread among the 
alliance members more widely than a random pattern would suggest (“win-win”); the 
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smaller firm in an alliance tends to do better than the larger firm (“relative size”); and 
inter-group alliance announcements are more favorably received by the market than are 
intra-group alliance announcements (“inter-group synergy”).  Alliances involving foreign 
firms, however, do not achieve significantly higher abnormal returns than do domestic-
domestic alliances.  Foreign partners are valued, but not more so than domestic partners. 
 
V. Implications of Our Findings 
The stagnant Japanese economy since the early 1990s has caused increased 
difficulty for Japanese financial institutions, especially banks, while drawing a large 
amount of international attention.  Peaking at 38,915.87 points in December 1989, the 
Nikkei 225 Stock Index hit 15,258.74 points at the end of 1997, a 60.8% drop from the 
1980s high.  Similarly, TOPIX, a broader stock index, peaked at 2,884.8 points in 
December 1989 and fell to 1,175.03 points at the end of 1997, a 59.27% drop from the 
1980s high.  Moreover, the index of residential land prices in the six largest cities 
dropped about 50% by 1997, compared with the 1990 index.  The continued economic 
problems have significantly decreased the values of collateral, loan portfolios, and 
securities holdings in Japan’s financial institutions.  There is little doubt that the 1990s 
have been the coldest and longest winter for Japanese financial institutions and their 
corresponding regulators. 
Our findings that a strategic alliance between financial institutions increases firm 
value, however, should be welcome news and have implications in corporate strategy, 
regulatory policy, and financial system design.  Unlike U.S. companies that often take on 
aggressive value-enhancing strategies such as acquisitions, spin-offs, stock repurchases, 
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and so on, Japanese companies have been laggards in pursuing drastic corporate 
strategies.  The Big Bang financial deregulation has significantly changed the competitive 
possibilities and the strategic thinking of Japanese financial institutions.  They formed 
alliances to reduce over-capacity, broaden customer bases, and enhance competitiveness.  
And investors reacted positively to these strategic movements.  This favorable reception 
may encourage financial institutions to adopt more aggressive strategies in the future. 
 
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
 
 This paper examines the announcement effects of strategic alliances involving 
Japanese financial institutions such as banks, insurance companies, and securities firms.  
Our primary results are as follows: 
 First, we find that a strategic alliance, on average, increases the value of the 
partner firms.  This is consistent with the “synergy” hypothesis.  Second, the gains from 
the alliance are spread more widely among the partners than would be suggested by a 
random alternative, supporting a “win-win” hypothesis.  Third, smaller partners tend to 
experience larger percentage gains, which is consistent with a “relative size” hypothesis.  
Fourth, the market values inter-group alliance announcements much more than intra-
group alliance announcements; the latter may well be seen as redundant.  This is 
consistent with an “inter-group synergies” hypothesis.  Fifth, we do not find a significant 
difference in the abnormal returns showed by domestic-foreign alliances and domestic-
domestic alliances, although both sets of alliances show significantly positive returns.  
We thus do not find support for a “foreign firm superior” hypothesis.  Finally, we find 
that an investment-banking alliance has a strong positive effect on abnormal returns, 
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indicating that investment banking, which is underdeveloped in Japan relative to the U.S., 
may be a promising business for financial institutions. 
 Overall, this paper complements the existing literature in that we analyze the 
value of financial-institution alliances.  Our analysis reconfirms that strategic alliances 
are value-enhancing.  This is consistent with previous studies that find increased value in 
the announcement of a strategic alliance, joint venture, or merger.  Our results suggest 
that deregulation tends to increase competition, which, in turn, encourages firms to adopt 
aggressive corporate strategies such as strategic alliances.  This is viewed as a positive 
move by investors, as is evidenced by the gains of the shareholders of the alliance-
forging firms. 
 
 
Appendix:   Examples of different types of strategic alliances 
 
Domestic/foreign alliance 
 
Nikko Securities of Japan and Travelers Group of the U.S. announced that they had 
agreed to form a comprehensive alliance in the Japanese market.   They unveiled plans to 
set up a joint venture in which nearly all of Nikko’s corporate securities business would 
be merged with the Japanese arm of Travelers Salomon Smith Barney (The Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, 06/02/98). 
 
Domestic/foreign alliance 
 
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Japan’s third largest bank, and J.P. Morgan Co., the U.S.’s fourth 
largest bank, will launch a 3 billion yen investment-trust joint venture to develop and 
market investment trusts exclusively through the Japanese bank’s branches (The Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun, 10/01/98). 
 
Intra-keiretsu alliance 
 
Four financial companies in the Mitsubishi group (Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Meiji Life 
Insurance Co., Mitsubishi Trust & Banking Co. and Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Co.) 
announced a comprehensive alliance in insurance, investment trusts, securities and 
pension-fund management (The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 09/12/98). 
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Inter-keiretsu alliance 
 
Asahi Bank and Tokai Bank jointly announced that they have reached basic agreements 
on a comprehensive alliance to include cross-shareholding, joint development of 
derivative financial products, and the integration of redundant branches.  The partnership 
could also be extended to form a joint holding company (The Nihon Keizai Shimbun 
Evening Edition, 09/28/98).  
 
Inter-industry alliance 
 
Industrial Bank of Japan, the seventh largest bank, and Nomura Securities, Japan’s 
largest brokerage house, said they will form two 50%-50% joint venture in derivatives 
products and asset management, respectively (The Nihon Keizai Shimbun Evening 
Edition, 05/14/98). 
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Table 1:  The Time Distribution of 109 Strategic-Alliance Announcements 
 
 
Time of Announcement Number of Announcements  Percent of Total 
 
1997 Q1       1      0.92% 
1997 Q2       1      0.92 
1997 Q3       6      5.5 
1997 Q4       5      4.59 
1998 Q1       6      5.5 
1998 Q2     14    12.84 
1998 Q3     11    10.09 
1998 Q4     20    18.35 
1999 Q1     16    14.68 
1999 Q2       8      7.34 
1999 Q3     11    10.09 
1999 Q4     10      9.17 
 
Total      109    100% 
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Table 2:  The Sample Distribution of 109 Strategic-Alliance Announcements by the 
Number of Lines of Business Involved 
 
 
Number of Announcements Percent of Total
 
Single-business alliance    80   73.39% 
 
Multiple-business alliance    20   18.35 
 
Comprehensive-business alliance     9     8.26  
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Table 3:  The Sample Distribution of 109 Strategic-Alliance Announcements by 
Different Characteristics 
 
 
Characteristic     Number of Alliances  
 
Domestic firm/foreign firm    60   
 
Equity tie-up      52   
 
Investment product     37 
 
Asset management     24 
 
Intra-group      17 
 
Insurance business       7 
 
Investment banking       7 
 
Inter-group        5 
 
Others       20 
 
 
 
Note:  Each alliance may have multiple characteristics. 
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Table 4:  The (day –1, day 0) Abnormal Returns of 109 Alliance Announcements 
 
 
      Average abnormal return Z-statistic
 
All sample (109 alliances)   2.87%    11.21 
 
 
Median abnormal return  
 
All sample (109 alliances)   1.39% 
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Table 5:  The Distribution of Domestic Alliances (d/f = 0), by the Numbers of Firms with 
Returns Data and the Signs of Their (day -1, day 0) Abnormal Returns Announcements 
 
 
 
Total number of domestic alliances (d/f = 0): 49 
 
Number of domestic alliances with 2 or more publicly traded firms: 39 
 
Number of domestic alliances with 2 publicly traded firms: 26 
 Signs of (day –1, day 0) abnormal returns for the 2 firms: 
  +,+: 13 
  +,-:   9 
  -,-:   4 
 
Number of domestic alliances with 3 publicly traded firms: 11 
 Signs of  (day –1, day 0) abnormal returns for the 3 firms: 
  +,+,+:   3 
  +,+,-:   4 
  +,-,-:   1 
  -,-,-:   3 
 
Number of domestic alliances with 4 publicly traded firms: 2 
 Signs of (day –1, day 0) abnormal returns for the 4 firms: 
  +,+,+,-:  1 
  -,-,-,-:   1 
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Table 6: Firm-Specific (day –1, day 0) Abnormal Returns for Domestic Alliance (d/f = 0) 
Announcements  
 
 
 
Total number of domestic alliances (d/f = 0): 49 
 
Number of domestic alliances with 2 or more publicly traded firms: 39 
 
Number of domestic alliances with 2 publicly traded firms: 26 
 Number of announcements where the smaller firm showed the greater AR: 15  
Mean difference in AR when the smaller firm showed the greater AR: +5.23%  
Mean difference in AR when the larger firm showed the greater AR: +2.62%  
 
Number of domestic alliances with 3 publicly traded firms: 11 
 Number of announcements where the smallest firm showed the greater AR: 6  
Mean difference in AR when the smallest firm showed the greater AR: +5.10%  
Mean difference in AR when the largest firm showed the greater AR: +3.37%  
 
Number of domestic alliances with 4 publicly traded firms: 2 
 Number of announcements where the smallest firm showed the greater AR: 1  
 Mean difference in AR when the smallest firm showed the greater AR: +12.70% 
Mean difference in AR when the largest firm showed the greater AR: +0.55%  
 
Overall (39 domestic alliances): 
 Number of announcements where the smaller firm showed the greater AR: 22  
 Mean difference in AR when the smallest firm showed the greater AR: +5.53%  
  (s.e. = 1.51) 
 Mean difference in AR when the largest firm showed the greater AR: +2.72%  
  (s.e. = 0.64) 
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Table 7: The (day –1, day 0) Abnormal Returns for Foreign (d/f =1) and Domestic (d/f = 0) 
Alliance Announcements 
 
 
      Average abnormal return Z-statistic
 
All sample (109 alliances)   2.87%    11.21 
 
D/f = 1 sample (60 alliances)   2.65%      8.78 
 
D/f = 0 sample (49 alliances)   3.13%      7.01 
 
 
 
      Median abnormal return
 
All sample (109 alliances)   1.39%     
 
D/f = 1 sample (60 alliances)   1.48%     
 
D/f = 0 sample (49 alliances)   1.39%     
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Table 8: Regression Results when (day –1, day 0) Abnormal Returns for Alliances Are the 
Dependent Variable (t-statistics are in parentheses) 
 
Variable Regres. (1) Regres. (2) Regres. (3)
    
Constant 4.67 1.72 4.36 
 (3.31) (1.24) (2.64)
    
D/f -0.67 0.19 0.34 
 (0.48) (0.14) (0.23)
    
Intra-group -2.82 -3.04 -1.93
 (2.01) (2.33) (1.31)
    
Inter-group 1.40 0.86 1.37 
 (0.46 (0.26) (0.42)
    
Capital tie-up 0.06 1.31 0.29 
 (0.06) (1.18) (0.24)
    
Insurance -2.93 - -3.75
 (1.43)  (1.72)
    
Investment product -2.01 - -2.94
 (1.56)  (1.99)
    
Asset management -1.01 - -2.40
 (0.76)  (1.55)
    
Investment banking 4.46 - 2.59 
 (1.98)  (1.05)
    
Others -1.50 - -2.50
 (0.92)  (1.39)
    
Multiple-business - 2.62 3.00 
  (1.90) (1.84)
    
Comprehensive-business - 2.80 -0.05
  (1.16) (0.02)
    
R2 0.21 0.16 0.24 
    
n 109 109 109 
Note:  Weighted least squares regressions are used, with the inverse of the standard errors of 
the ARs as weights; see Saxonhouse (1976).  
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Table 9: The (day –1, day 0) Abnormal Returns of Announcements Involving Intra-group 
and Inter-group Alliances 
 
 
 
Number of intra-group alliance announcements: 17  
 Mean AR of intra-group announcements: +0.58% 
 
Number of inter-group alliance announcements: 5  
 Mean AR of inter-group announcements: +4.55%  
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